The psychology of internet fraud victimisation:A systematic review by Norris, Gareth et al.
Aberystwyth University
The psychology of internet fraud victimisation
Norris, Gareth; Brookes, Alexandra; Dowell, David
Published in:
Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology
DOI:
10.1007/s11896-019-09334-5
Publication date:
2019
Citation for published version (APA):
Norris, G., Brookes, A., & Dowell, D. (2019). The psychology of internet fraud victimisation: A systematic review.
Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11896-019-09334-5
Document License
CC BY
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Aberystwyth Research Portal (the Institutional Repository) are
retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the
legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Aberystwyth Research Portal for the purpose of private study or
research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Aberystwyth Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
tel: +44 1970 62 2400
email: is@aber.ac.uk
Download date: 03. Oct. 2019
The Psychology of Internet Fraud Victimisation: a Systematic Review
Gareth Norris1 & Alexandra Brookes1 & David Dowell2
# The Author(s) 2019
Abstract
Existing theories of fraud provide some insight into how criminals target and exploit people in the online environment; whilst
reference to psychological explanations is common, the actual use of established behavioural theories and/or methods in these
studies is often limited. In particular, there is less understanding of why certain people/demographics are likely to respond to
fraudulent communications. This systematic reviewwill provide a timely synthesis of the leading psychologically based literature
to establish the key theories and empirical research that promise to impact on anti-fraud policies and campaigns. Relevant
databases and websites were searched using terms related to psychology and fraud victimisation. A total of 44 papers were
extracted and 34 included in the final analysis. The studies range in their scope and methods; overall, three main factors were
identified: message (n = 6), experiential (n = 7), and dispositional (n = 21), although there was some overlap between these (for
example, mapping message factors onto the dispositional traits of the victim). Despite a growing body of research, the total
number of studies able to identify specific psychological processes associated with increased susceptibility to online fraud
victimisation was limited. Messages are targeted to appeal to specific psychological vulnerabilities, the most successful linking
message with human factors, for example, time-limited communications designed to enact peripheral rather than central infor-
mation processing. Suggestions for future research and practical interventions are discussed.
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Introduction
The FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) recently
reported figures that show Internet-enabled theft, fraud, and
exploitation being responsible for $2.7 billion in financial
losses in 2018 (FBI 2018). The annual Internet Crime
Report shows that IC3 received 351,936 complaints last
year—nearly 1000 per day—with non-payment/non-delivery
scams, extortion, and personal data breaches the most fre-
quently reported. The most financially costly were business
email compromise, romance or confidence fraud, and invest-
ment scams. Internet-based fraud was the fastest growing
crime in the UK in 2015–2016, with 3.25 million victims each
year and an annual combined loss of £3.6 billion (Button et al.
2016). Estimates indicate 4.7 million incidents of fraud and
computer misuse were experienced by adults aged 16 and over
in England and Wales for the survey year ending September
2017 (ONS, 2017). Button and Cross (2017; p. 23) provide a
summary on the rising role of technology in perpetuating these
crimes: ‘[i]ndeed it is estimated globally there are 29 billion
spam emails daily and that the email virus rate is 1 in 196 and
phishing emails are 1 in 392’. The on-going infiltration and
reliance on technology into our daily lives is likely to see this
trend increase in the short-to-medium term until we develop
suitable strategies to stay secure online.
However, despite current efforts to educate individuals on
the way in which criminals operate online, millions of these
fraudulent activities—from phishing attempts to ‘lonely
hearts’ scams—are responded to each year (NAO 2017); in-
herent human weaknesses for incentive-driven behaviours
seemingly make many of these scams too alluring to resist.
For example, priming individuals with images of money has
been shown to reduce helpfulness towards others and increase
isolation in tasks involving new acquaintances (Vohs et al.
2006). Similarly, financial decisions elicit different brain
structures to similar non-financial rewards (Knutson et al.
2000). Anecdotally, we know that fraud-related messages
are designed to exploit certain behavioural and demographic
‘weaknesses’, for example, impulsiveness and/or loneliness
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(Duffield and Grabosky 2001). Button et al. (2009) note
that when considering the perpetrators of fraud, ‘[…]
there is only limited data available. Even the law enforce-
ment community does not always know the background
of the perpetrators.’ (p. 13). Significantly, the existing
fraud literature is limited in scope in terms of exploring
the ‘how’ and the ‘why’—in precisely what way they
influence individual decision-making processes? Thus,
this systematic review aims to connect some of these
methodological and conceptual links to establish how
message, experiential, and dispositional factors may influ-
ence an individual’s cognitive processing associated with
increased likelihood for Internet fraud victimisation.
Previous Reviews
There are a number of reviews in the wider online/consumer
fraud area, although the focus for many is age as a risk factor.
Jackson’s (2017) evaluation is predominantly aimed at meth-
odological and prevalence issues and suggests a lack of
knowledge of risk factors in the financial exploitation of older
people increases propensity for fraud. More recently, a review
by Burnes et al. (2017) expands upon many of these points to
also include susceptibility to web scams. Incorporating the
wider issue of consumer fraud, Ross et al. (2014) attempt to
dispel some of the myths regarding age-related victimisation
and increased vulnerability. They document six key areas
where older people are more likely to be disproportionately
exploited by fraudsters, for example, slower cognitive pro-
cessing and increased trust. However, Ross et al. suggest that
age can also act as a protective factor in the sense that older
people are less likely to use the Internet for financial transac-
tions. In particular, they caution that vulnerability does not
equal prevalence; Ross et al. conclude that psychological re-
search in this area must not overly stereotype older people in
the sense that policies designed to reduce victimisation mis-
takenly create further opportunities for crime.
A recently published report evaluation of fraud typologies
and victims by the UK National Fraud Authority (NFA) high-
lights how victims are selected, approach strategies, and pro-
files of victims (Button et al. 2016). This report identifies a
number of research articles which indicate that targeting indi-
vidual susceptibility to fraud is a key feature of many scams;
for example, using time-limited responses to limit the amount
of deliberation. Risk taking and low self-control are also iden-
tified as additional personality factors linked to characteristics
of fraud victims. The report also goes some way to dispel the
myth that older people are more probable victims (although
they are more likely to experience fraud than theft or robbery).
Lower levels of reporting may be more apparent in older
victims—whether they knew the fraud had taken place or
not—with those who blamed themselves also being less likely
to report. Significantly, active social networks encouraged
reporting; these may be less extensive in some older popula-
tions. Ultimately, Button et al. caution that: ‘[…] what is strik-
ing about of [sic] the scams is that the profiles cover almost
everybody; hence almost anyone could become the victim of a
scam’ (p. 24). Consequently, although we can observe some
small variations in demographics of fraud victims (e.g. age,
gender, SES), it appears that individual psychological differ-
ences are likely to be the key factor in explaining why some
people are more likely to arrive at erroneous decisions in
responding to fraudulent online messages.
Theoretical and Conceptual Issues
The majority of previous research conducted in this area pre-
dominantly focus on the persuasive influence of the scam
message employed by the fraudster (see Chang and Chong
2010) or the knowledge of scams held by the potential victim
(see Harrison et al. 2016a). The purpose of this systematic
review is to extend that focus to incorporate variables related
to individual psychological differences, i.e. those which make
people more vulnerable to be deceived by fraudulent commu-
nications (see Judges et al. 2017). Research by Modic and
colleagues has highlighted individual differences to scam
compliance through the lens of susceptibility to persuasion
and wider theoretical links with social influence (see Modic
et al. 2018; Modic and Lea 2013). The development of the
Susceptibility to Persuasion (StP) scale has demonstrated
good construct validity in relation to self-report scam plausi-
bility across large samples. The second iteration (StP-II; see
Modic et al. 2018) incorporates 10 subscales measuring indi-
vidual differences in a range of mechanisms, including sensa-
tion seeking, risk preferences, and social influence. However,
we are still some way from achieving a robust and testable
model of online fraud susceptibility.
Dispositional factors currently assessed in the literature
predominantly focus on demographic factors, such as age,
gender, income, and education (Purkait et al. 2014), in con-
junction with individual characteristics, such as low self-
control (Holtfreter et al. 2008), high levels of perceived lone-
liness (Buchanan and Whitty 2014), and impulsivity
(Pattinson et al. 2011). The application of Petty and
Cacioppo’s (1986) elaboration likelihood model (ELM) to
explain how psychological mechanisms impact deception
likelihood is common (see Vishwanath et al. 2011), although
few have applied this theoretical model to explore how dispo-
sitional factors influence an individual’s cognitive processing
associated with victimisation. Similarly, there are a limited
number of experimental designs or use of large secondary data
sets in this field, both of which would provide the vital under-
standing of ‘how’ these influences occur. Upon reflection,
much of the literature exploring dispositional factors and
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vulnerability to fraud is limited in scope in terms of under-
standing the psychological mechanisms that lead people to
become victims of these scams. Without sufficient grounding
in established psychological mechanisms, attempts to prevent
or limit victimisation will likely underperform. The aim of this
systematic review is to collate and analyse the key research in
relation to the psychology of Internet fraud to ascertain the
baseline theoretical and research knowledge in this growing
area, focusing on established psychological theories and em-
pirically based methodologies.
Methodology
Objectives To examine the extent to which psychological the-
ories have been empirically tested to explain Internet fraud
victimisation through a systematic review of the literature.
The primary focus is upon understanding the literature which
relates to how victims respond to fraudulent communications
as opposed to the offender. However, as Button, Lewis, and
Tapley (2009, p. 15) note: ‘[t]he growing literature upon dif-
ferent types of fraud provides much information on the tech-
niques of fraudsters. These diverse range of tactics used [can]
be considered under three sub-headings, victim selection tech-
niques, perpetration strategies and finally detection avoiding
strategies’:
& Victim selection techniques concern the strategies that
fraudsters use to contact their victims, e.g. email or virus.
& Perpetration strategies: once the victim has been identi-
fied, these are the techniques used by fraudsters to secure
money or identity, e.g. legitimate appearance of an email.
& Detection avoidance techniques: techniques used by
fraudsters that would minimise their risk of getting
caught/sentenced, e.g. making reporting unlikely if ask
for a small sum of money.
It is the first two of these that is the focus of this review and
primarily the aim is to consolidate our understanding of the
psychological mechanisms by which perpetrator (message)
and victim (respondent) interact.
Search MethodsMultiple investigators (GN andAB) indepen-
dently screened both titles and abstracts and relevant full-text
articles from the following databases: PsychINFO, ProQuest,
International Bibliography of the Social Sciences; Applied
Social Science Index and Abstracts, Sociological Abstracts;
Sage Criminology; Criminal Justice Abstracts, alongside grey
literature from Dissertation Abstracts Online and COS
Conference Paper Index. Figure 1 shows the flow diagram
outlining the search and exclusion process conforming to the
Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-
Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines (Moher et al. 2009). Full tech-
nical data for the systematic review is included in Appendix A.
Inclusion CriteriaThe key inclusion criteria were that the paper
should be an empirical examination of an established psycho-
logical theory relating to online fraud. In order to minimise
more general commentary and published statistics articles, we
restricted our search criteria to peer-reviewed journal articles,
conference presentations, and book chapters in English. Both
quantitative and qualitative studies were acceptable, but the
latter should employ a recognised analysis technique, for ex-
ample, interpretive phenomenological analysis (IPA), as op-
posed to more anecdotal commentaries of cases, scams, etc.
Exclusion Criteria There were a large number of articles ex-
tracted and screened full text before being rejected as not
fulfilling the inclusion criteria (n = 1036). The majority of
these articles purported to include psychological theories
and/or measures (for example, personality). Additional exclu-
sions included other fraud types (e.g. corporate or academic
fraud), those not focusing on the individual or individual fac-
tors (e.g. socialisation), and did not include at least one
established and testable psychological theory (e.g. loneliness).
Data Collection and Analysis
Main Results A total of 1299 initial papers were extracted; 39
papers were included in the final search after the exclusion
criteria were applied and an additional 5 equivocal items also
added (n = 44) (see Fig. 1). From this, a further 10 were ex-
cluded by a third author (DD) due to not including an
established psychological theory and/or were theoretical
models or existing reviews (i.e. not empirical studies). The final
number of reviewed articles was 34. The studies range in their
scope and methods; overall, three main factors were identified:
message, experiential, and dispositional (see Fig. 2).
Meta-analysisGiven the diverse nature of the theoretical back-
ground and unrelated outcome measures from each study, a
meta-analysis of the findings is not appropriate.
Summary of Studies
Modic and Lea (2013) regard Internet fraud as a staged pro-
cess, involving: ‘[…] plausibility, interaction with a fraudster,
and losing utility to fraud’ (p. 15); once an offer is deemed
plausible, the later stages are therefore more likely to be forth-
coming. The review highlighted some broad groupings under
which the empirical research in this area has been targeted.
The key variables associated with decisions as to whether or
not to decide whether information via the internet is plausible
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can be divided into two key areas: deceiver and receiver in-
fluence (see Fig. 1). These categories represent both the
content of the message and the way in which it interacts with
the target. The receiver characteristics can also be further di-
vided into two distinct elements: experiential and
dispositional factors. Experiential factors relate to the person’s
Fig. 1 PRISMA flow diagram for
identifying psychologically based
studies into Internet-based fraud
Decision Making Cues
Deceiver Inﬂuence Message Factors
- Liking
- Reciprocity
- Social Proof
- Consistency
- Authority
- Scarcity
Receiver Inﬂuence
Experienal Factors
- Computer Self-Eﬃcacy 
- Web Experience
- Scam Knowledge
- Risk Percepon
Disposional Factors
- Personality 
- Loneliness
- Cognive Ability
- Self-Control
- Idealizaon
- Social Isolaon
- Psychological Well-
Being 
- Disposional Trust 
Fig. 2 Summary diagram of the
variables and processes which
influence an individual’s ability to
correctly identify fraudulent
communications
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knowledge and experience of computers and knowledge of
fraudulent activity. Dispositional factors include personality,
heuristics, and cognitive ability.
Message Factors
The 6 papers classified into this category primarily focused on
how the fraudulent message was framed in order to maximise
the potential for enticing a victim (Table 1). In these articles,
only limited mapping onto demographic or individual factors
was made. Experimental designs included ‘fake’ phishing
emails sent out to university staff and students purporting to
be from ‘Information Services’ requesting account verifica-
tion (Luo et al. 2013). Follow-up studies of respondent demo-
graphics and personality features in these ‘real-world’ exper-
iments would potentially yield important results for under-
standing fraud victims’ behaviour, although ethically they
may present some limitations.
Fischer et al. (2013) highlight four key factors that make
people more likely to respond to fraudulent communications:
(1) high motivation triggers in the size of the reward; (2) trust
by focusing on interaction rather than message content, often
generated by using ‘official’ notices, logos etc.; (3) social influ-
ence, including liking and reciprocation, designed to gain com-
pliance; and (4) the scarcity or urgency of the opportunity.
Utilising several waves of quantitative and qualitative studies,
Fischer et al. found mixed support for these four elements asso-
ciated with the message factors and indeed concluded that a fifth
factor—personality—may indeed be more indicative of those
people likely to predict victimisation. Fischer et al. suggest that
this could be in some way linked to ‘self-confidence’ and an
increased belief in one’s ability to detect scams. Scam compli-
ance was linked to decision-making errors—exploitation of heu-
ristics (judgement inaccuracies)—and hence limits the explora-
tion of message factors alone as a viable explanation of fraud. It
appears that individual differences are more relevant to under-
standing the way messages are constructed and what processes
they are likely to exploit. For example, in what way does a ‘time-
limited’ message interact with certain individual’s decision-
making processes that make them more likely to respond.
The review highlighted that the content of the message was
important to ‘hook’ the target to engaging with the deception.
For example, Luo et al. (2013) demonstrated that messages
with high source credibility and quality arguments are partic-
ularly effective in ‘spear phishing’1 attacks.Wang et al. (2012)
also found that ‘time-limited’messages (those which required
a quick response) were more likely to be responded to than
those which appeared less urgent; it suggests that these
Table 1 Summary table of articles focusing on message factors (n = 6)
Authors Year Location Theory Method Sample Key findings
Luo, Zhang, Burd,
and Seazzu
2013 USA Information processing;
heuristics
Experimental University staff and
faculty (n = 105)
Phishing attacks benefit from
high source credibility and
time-limited responses.
Vishwanath 2016 USA Cognitive, heuristics Experimental University students
(study 1: n = 64;
study 2: n = 40)
Mobile devices lead to more
phishing attack response
through screen size,
cognitive demands,
and habituation.
Fisher, Lea,
and Evans
2013 UK Heuristics, social influence,
individual differences
Cross-sectional
survey
Community research
panel (n = 103) and
community (n = 85)
Size of reward can (negatively)
impact on decision-making;
cues of trust and authority
predicted scam compliance.
Harrison, Vishwanath,
Ng and Rao
2015 USA Heuristics - dual
process models
Experimental University
Students (n = 85)
Richness in phishing email
were heuristically processed
and led to increased
victimisation
Holtfreter, Reisig
and Pratt
2008 USA Self-control and
rational choice
Cross-sectional
survey
Community telephone
sample (n = 922)
Low self-control leads to
higher fraud victimisation;
higher online consumer
behaviour predicts
victimisation.
Wang, Herath et al. 2012 USA Cognitive (ELM);
attention
Experimental University
students (n = 321)
Time limitation increase
responding; deception
indicators (e.g. grammar)
increase attention and limit
responding
1 ‘Spear phishing’ differs from ‘phishing’ in that it is targeted at particular
individuals and/or groups; the message is highly relevant and mirrors official
communication styles and presentation.
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‘visceral triggers’ reduce the cognitive effort expended upon
assessing the authenticity of the message. Vishwanath (2016)
extends this perspective to the use of smartphones as a means
of reducing cognitive involvement in email filtering, along-
side usage variables such as habituation. Responding to fraud-
ulent messages on smartphones was found to be more proba-
ble, potentially due to increased cognitive demands and fur-
ther impacted by the presentation on smaller screens and rou-
tine engagement with continued email demands whilst on the
move. Certainly, fraudulent responding on smartphones is one
potential additional variable to be included in future research.
Experiential Factors
A total of 7 papers were classified into the experiential category,
focusing primarily on the experience and expertise of the end-
user (Table 2). Knowledge of internet scams was one way in
which people showed some resilience to victimisation; for ex-
ample, Wright and Marett (2010) indicated that people with
higher levels of computer self-efficacy, web experience, and
security knowledge were less susceptible to phishing attempts.
However, Internet use itself was not a protective factor; for
some, usage patterns predicted whether they were likely to
respond to fraudulent requests, with those people dealing with
significantly high email traffic more likely to respond to mes-
sages (van Wilsem 2011; see also Vishwanath 2015). Self-
control was identified as a key predictor in whether people were
able to withhold responses to fraudulent requests in van
Wilsem’s study; what did emerge was a promising underlying
pathway that linked low self-control to engaging in more online
consumer behaviour generally. Interestingly, Vishwanath
(2015) proposes that email behaviour—particularly habitual
use—is linked to low social and emotional control and predic-
tive of increased likelihood to respond to phishing emails.
Harrison et al. (2016a) demonstrate that individual process-
ing styles were also indicative of the likelihood of fraud
responding, although this link was moderated significantly
by individual factors linked to email knowledge and
experience. Similarly, Zielinska et al. (2015) compared ex-
perts and novices in their ability to conceptually link phishing
characteristics, discovering the latter used much simpler men-
tal processes in evaluating how a message might be a phishing
attempt. Using a novel neurological pathway design,
Zielinska and colleagues demonstrate how semantic connec-
tions become more sophisticated following experience with
how phishing attacks are executed and how to take steps to
avoid fraudulent victimisation. The implications for interven-
tions are evident; in addition, the prospects to map these nov-
ice reactions to phishing attempts enable a deeper understand-
ing of the way in which people become victims, i.e. the per-
sonal factors that limit the way in which people optimise their
decision-making strategies.
Hence, a person’s own competency with Internet safety
cannot alone explain how they become victims of web-
based fraud. Rather, it is an interaction between their ability
and usage of the web and general dispositional factors, such as
more deliberate and controlled information processing, which
are possibly more fruitful avenues of future research in this
domain. Potentially, habitual email users are susceptible—
feasibly through low social control—to the way in which
fraudulent messages are framed, for example, through the
use of time-limited rewards, particularly when using mobile
Table 2 Summary table of articles focusing on experiential factors (n = 7)
Authors Year Location Theory Method Sample Key findings
Moody and Galleta 2011 USA Individual differences:
trust, boredom
proneness, risk
Experimental College students
(n = 632)
Internet experience (higher usage)
and risk tendency (lower financial
risk takers) most predictive of
phishing responses
Harrison, Vishwanath,
and Rao
2016 USA Heuristics (GCS) Experimental University students
(n = 192)
Individuals with high general
communicative suspicion (GCS)
less likely to be phishing victim
van Wilsem 2011 Netherlands Self-control and
rational choice
Cross-sectional
survey
Secondary data:
large-scale longitudinal
survey (n = 6201)
Low self-control leads to higher
fraud victimisation; higher
internet use predicts victimisation
Vishwanath 2015 USA Personality, heuristics Experimental University students
(n = 192)
Conscientious and habitual email
responders more likely to
respond to phishing requests
Zielinska, Welk, Mayhorn,
and Murphy-Hill
2015 USA Heuristics—mental
models
Cross-sectional
survey
Students (n = 20) and
industry experts
(n = 15)
Novices had simpler mental models
to detect phishing; experience
increased protective factors
Harrison, Svetieva,
and Vishwanath
2015 USA Cognitive (ELM);
experience
Experimental University students
(n = 113)
Knowledge did not increase
resilience to victimisation;
message cues had little effect
on information processing
Wright and Marett 2010 USA Interpersonal deception
theory (IDT)
Experimental University students
(n = 446)
Experience and training led to
reduced phishing susceptibility
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devices. It appears, however, that whilst message content and
Internet experience have some predictive ability, the key me-
diating factor is individual dispositional factors that demon-
strate the way in which message and experiential factors are
processed.
Dispositional Factors
In reviewing the literature in the previous sections, it becomes
apparent that the individual is central to the fraud victimisation
process. Fischer et al. (2013) posit the question as to: ‘[w]hy
do so many people all over the world, so often, react to
completely worthless scam offers?’ (p. 2060). Likewise, de-
spite the investment in firewalls and anti-virus software, the so
called semantic attacks exploit inerrant weaknesses in the
system—the individual—to divulge sensitive information
(Harrison et al. 2016a, b; p. 265). Workman (2008) formalises
this process of social engineering as: ‘[…] techniques used to
manipulate people into performing actions or divulging con-
fidential information’ (p. 662). Subsequently, the key mediat-
ing factor between the message(s) and whether experience/
expertise in detecting fraud is likely to be practical are indi-
vidual and personality variables.
One of the most cited papers in this domain is an early
examination by Langenderfer and Shimp (2001) (Table 3).
Although not focused solely on Internet-based fraud, it none-
theless identifies the ‘visceral influences’ that make individ-
uals vulnerable to scams, through a process that reduces the
cognitive deliberation when faced with a message. Notably,
Langenderfer and Shrimp utilise Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986)
theory of persuasion: the elaboration likelihoodmodel (ELM).
In essence, ELM suggests that individuals who are motivated
to respond to the content contained in a fraudulent message
are likely to focus and be persuaded by the key messages. On
the other hand, those less motivated by the content are more
likely to be influenced by peripheral cues. Hence, motivation
is likely to be negatively correlated with scam victimisation;
the higher the level of motivation, the more likely attention
will be expended upon aspects of the message and cues to
deception identified. However, although widely cited,
Langenderfer and Shimp (2001) rely heavily on largely anec-
dotal evidence for their ELM-based theory of scam compli-
ance. Additional studies examining the relevance of ELM
have found mixed support for the relevance of this individual
factor relating to fraud victimisation (see Whitty 2013; Chang
2008), although Vishwanath et al. (2011) do support the ELM
approach in conjunction with message and experiential
influences.
In the previous section, the link between computer knowl-
edge and self-control are identified by van Wilsem (2011).
Results from Dickman’s (1990) Impulsivity Inventory
(DII)—as a measure of self-control—support the expected
link between increased levels of fraud susceptibility.
Pattinson et al. (2011) examine cognitive impulsivity along-
side personality and computer familiarity. Personality was less
predictive of fraud susceptibility—with the exception of
agreeableness—than familiarity with computers generally
(see the ‘Experiential Factors” section). With regard to impul-
sivity, however, there was only a small relationship; generally
speaking, less impulsive respondents are more able to manage
potentially fraudulent messages. Using willingness to take
risky investments as a proxy for low self-control, Chen et al.
(2017) identify the role impulsivity has in susceptibility to
responding to phishingmessages, particularly those promising
financial gains. Chen et al. advocate the ‘unpacking’ of the
way in which Internet scams exploit impulsive individuals
through financial rewards. Reisig and Holtfreter (2013) add
additional support for the notion that lower levels of self-
control are correlated to fraud victimisation.
Wider ‘personality’ correlates with fraud susceptibility are
often featured in studies, yet many of these fail to incorporate
established psychological theories from personality research
and/or validated instruments. From those studies that did meet
the inclusion criteria, a number attempt more exploratory re-
search into the Big 5 personality characteristics. Hong et al.
(2013) record negative correlations for openness to experience
and introversion being more likely to delete legitimate emails.
Hence, although these respondents were less prone to being
victims of phishing messages, lower levels of trust (also mea-
sured) were predictive of general suspicion and potential re-
jection of genuine communication as a result. In contrast, only
agreeableness was identified as a risk factor in Pattinson
et al.’s (2011) research. Alternative personality inventories,
for example, the HEXACO Personality Inventory (Judges
et al. 2017) and the DISC Personality Questionnaire
(Chuchuen and Chanvarasuth 2015), provide additional evi-
dence for general personality influence in fraud susceptibility.
Whilst some small links with potential to increase
victimisation and personality factors emerge from these and
other studies—for example, conscientiousness (victims have
lower scores)—lead Chuchuen and Chanvarasuth (2015) cau-
tion that given the wide-range of phishing and fraudulent mes-
sage content, no one personality feature is likely to predict
susceptibility in isolation: ‘[…] there is relatively little infor-
mation about the relationship between personality types and
phishing techniques. However, there is some interesting liter-
ature on the relationship between decision-making that could
reflect upon this area’ (p. 332).
The ELM/schema models suggest that central and periph-
eral decision strategies are key to understanding how cues to
fraudulent messages are neglected (Langenderfer and Shimp
2001). Additional heuristics and potential judgement errors
have also been examined: through a content analysis of phish-
ing emails, Chang and Chong (2010) identify the representa-
tive, availability, and affect heuristics as possible sources of
decision errors. Similarly, anchoring—the tendency to use
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previous information as a base line for later decision
processing—compromised the ability to identify fraudulent
websites (Iuga et al. 2016). Other dispositional factors, include
executive functioning (Gavett et al. 2017), theory of deception
(a decision-making model; Alseadoon et al. 2012; Alseadoon
et al. 2013), and cognitive health and well-being (Lichtenberg
et al. 2013; James et al. 2014). Despite the obvious links to
fraud, judgement and decision-making would appear to be a
relatively underexplored area of research that potentially can
link message and received factors in a meaningful way.
Discussion
The preamble to this review highlighted the limited use
of established psychological theories in explaining
Internet fraud susceptibility. From the 34 papers that
met our inclusion criteria, there was still a lack of coher-
ence in the selection of appropriate psychological princi-
ples with which to explain the increased likelihood of
victimisation. In addition, there was a lack of consistency
in developing useful ways in which these established
psychological constructs added to our understanding of
fraud conducted via the Internet. In attempting to identify
the methods used by criminals and how they are targeted
at specific individuals, there is a need to accurately map
aspects of the message to individual differences, includ-
ing Internet usage and psychological factors. This task is
made more complex due to many of the papers reviewed
here incorporating two or more of the three identified
decision-making factors (message, experiential, and/or
dispositional).
Personality theories appear to tell us very little about
how people are more likely to respond to fraudulent
communication via the Internet. Extravert individuals
might be prone to higher levels of risk taking, but there
was no clear pathway linking extraversion and fraud sus-
ceptibility (Pattinson et al. 2011). Time-limited messages
might appeal to those with lower levels of social control
(Reisig and Holtfreter 2013). Similarly, neuroticism in-
creases fraud susceptibility (Cho et al. 2016), whereas
conscientiousness decreases this tendency (Judges et al.
2017). These observations only loosely map onto plausi-
ble individual level explanation. In reality, it seems that
the targeting of fraudulent emails—whether for phishing
attacks, romance scams, or bank frauds—is done largely
at random, through a high volume of communications.
However, the mass release of phishing scams disguises
somewhat the purposely considered message that is de-
signed to appeal to people of specific dispositions.
What is less clear is how these messages—of which
receivers negotiate several times per day—are only
sometimes successful, even amongst rational and
computer savvy individuals. Central versus peripheral
processing may provide the most useful way to
understand why people fall for scams, particularly
messages that emulate official and/or genuine communi-
cations. For example, Vishwanath et al. (2011) produce
a convincing account of the way in which message fac-
tors are linked to individual processing through the
ELM. In addition, domain-specific knowledge also reg-
ulates the ELM process, with increased scam knowledge
being linked to the attention given to email cues, i.e. a
high level of elaboration likelihood. Schwarz (1990) re-
views the evidence on the effect of mood upon visual
information processing more generally and concluded
that sad moods decreased global processing, whereas
those of a happier disposition focused more on local
factors. Specifically, when faced with ambiguous stimu-
li, mood states influenced how quickly people were
likely to process information, particularly when the in-
formation was relevant to them. Additionally, people in
a happy mood are more likely to pay attention to pos-
itive messages (for example, fake lottery wins). Current
theories (e.g. elaboration likelihood model (ELM); see
Petty and Briñol 2015) associated with mood influences
on information processing suggest that happy individ-
uals structure their response to stimuli in a top-down
manner, relying more on heuristics and schemas to aid
in understanding (Gasper 2004). The contrasting bottom
up approach of those in less happy mood states would
focus on the stimulus details more closely. Hence, we
can see for our understanding of Internet fraud vulner-
ability that mood could be one key factor that influ-
ences how we process potentially fraudulent communi-
cations, but as yet has not received significant attention
from researchers.
Practical implications concern the ability to identify
individuals most at risk of fraud and provide targeted
consumer educa t ion measures to he lp prevent
victimisation. We know less about the financial situation
and other background variables of fraud victims that
might increase their risk of victimization. For example,
does financial hardship lead people to take bigger
chances with regard to false promises of prizes?
Similarly, are those with physical and/or mental health
problems likely to engage in dialogue with fraudsters
through social isolation, anxiety, and other similar is-
sues? Perhaps people with a predisposition for extraver-
sion and/or risk taking may be ‘happier’, less likely to
attend to the peripheral aspects of messages (cues to
deception), and therefore be at a greater chance of being
fraud victims (Gasper, 2004). Additional research with a
theoretically and practically informed agenda is neces-
sary in this important and growing field. The search
terms and inclusion/exclusion criteria employed in this
J Police Crim Psych
review clearly focused on a relatively narrow band of
studies; wider reviews of what we know about the of-
fender and how they target victims specifically can add
value to this debate. It would appear that the most used
‘spam/phishing’ email, however, is largely indiscrimi-
nately aimed at a wide audience hoping to catch individ-
uals not fully processing the possibility these communi-
cations are fraudulent.
Currently, issues arise in protecting specific groups of
individuals, as a high proportion of any general aware-
ness campaign maybe targeted on people unlikely to
ever fall victim, for example, elderly non-Internet users
(Lea et al. 2009). This research may help bridge this
gap, in that if the more vulnerable groups are
identified—or are encouraged to self-identify—preven-
tion material can be specifically targeted at them. For
example, the UK National Policing ‘4 P’s’ to tackle
fraud and cyber-crime; specifically, elements concerning
‘protection’ and ‘preparation’ of potential fraud victims
(City of London Police 2015). Similarly, the current
‘Take 5’ campaign developed by The Metropolitan
Police with the support of the Financial Fraud Action
UK (FFA UK) highlights the importance of not imme-
diately responding to messages. Creating a time-buffer
to avoid the peripheral/heuristic interpretation of poten-
tially fraudulent requests could potentially limit the
number of responses. Experimental examinations of
how people can best control their responses would ap-
pear to be a fruitful avenue on the research agenda.
Methodological Limitations
Any systematic review will undoubtedly contain some
bias in terms of the search parameters employed; hence,
there may be papers which are not included here that
others might see as an omission. A number of papers
were rejected, most notably through the stipulation that
there be an established psychological theory. The ques-
tion as to what was deemed ‘established’ is somewhat
equivocal; for example, research by Van Wyk and
Mason (2001) was not included because the measures
for ‘risk taking’ and ‘socialisation’ were not from pub-
lished scales. Similarly, Button et al. (2014) acknowl-
edged that ‘[…] previous research studies have identi-
fied certain psychological traits […] This was beyond
the remit of this research’ (p. 400). Notably the research
by Modic and colleagues is absent from the reviewed
articles due to the search parameters employed here; the
development of the StP-II did not fully match our
criteria. Empirical examinations on the predictive valid-
ity of the StP-II are forthcoming (see Modic et al. 2018,
p. 16) and if successful will provide a way of
understanding and mapping personality characteristics
onto fraudulent activity.
There are also some methodological considerations to be
accounted for in regard to the studies themselves and in
particular their ecological validity in respects to accounting
for behaviour in the real world. Role play scenarios, in
which participants are asked to access the account of a
character and decide how they would deal with a number of
emails, may suffer from expectancy/observer effects. Jones
et al. (2015) argue:
[…] that the way in which these types of tasks are
constructed may still prompt socially desirable re-
sponses. For example, when given the option ‘type
the URL into a browser window’, may subsequent-
ly alert participants that this is the most sensible
option compared to other options such as ‘click
o n t h e l i n k ’ . P a r s o n s e t a l . ( 2 0 1 4 )
demonstrated—using a role-play task as a measure
of susceptibility—that knowledge of the nature of
the study affected behaviour. Participants identified
phishing emails more successfully when they had
been alerted to look out for them. Such subject
expectancy effects might affect the integrity of a
study even more than any socially desirable bias
(p. 20).
An example of a study using a role-play scenario
included in the systematic review is by Pattinson et al.
(2011). Jones et al. (2015) argue ‘possibly, the assess-
ment of vulnerability with the highest face validity, but
clearly the most ethically challenging, would be to stim-
ulate a genuine phishing attack by sending a fake phish-
ing email to participants and recording whether or not
they respond’ (p. 22). Two examples of studies that use
this method in the systematic review are by Luo et al.
(2013) and Vishwanath (2016). Hence, although many
studies suffer from a potential lack of ecological validity
and generalizability, there is a growing corpus of studies
which at the very least recognise the limitations inherent
in this research domain.
Conclusion
The purpose of this systematic review was to examine
the range of psychological factors associated with
Internet-based fraud victimisation to identify the way
in which Internet scams exploit inherently compromised
human decision-making. The majority of the studies
reviewed focused on ‘phishing’ and examined a range
of factors from personality through to heuristics.
Additionally, this included aspects of the message itself,
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although accurately mapping these two aspects together
is potentially less successful. The majority of evidence
and subsequent beliefs we have regarding the psycho-
logical factors associated with vulnerability to online
fraud are at best anecdotal and at worst in danger of
creating misleading myths (e.g. older people are ‘easy’
targets). Policies designed to limit the extent and impact
of fraud should clearly recognise the universal nature of
compliance and that no one demographic is necessarily
more or less vulnerable (But ton et a l . 2016) .
Additionally, whilst we have a steady source of material
in terms of fraudulent emails, we know less about
which are successful and/or why. Online fraud is rela-
tively unique in that examples of potential criminal ac-
tivity are openly available. Seemingly we are unable to
stop this onslaught, but we can limit their effectiveness
by increasing awareness and understanding. Through
gaining an insight into how they work and with whom,
the potential for law enforcement to create general and
targeted crime prevention initiatives is enhanced.
Seemingly, much of the existing literature on the
prevalence and prevention of Internet fraud has limited
scope in terms of understanding the psychological mech-
anisms that lead people to become victims of these
scams. Without sufficient grounding in established psy-
chological mechanisms, it is likely that attempts to limit
vict imisat ion wil l be potential ly flawed and/or
underperform. There are a limited number of experimen-
tal designs in this field; these provide a vital understand-
ing of how fraudulent attempts made via the Internet are
able to exploit innate human frailties in decision-making.
General models of risk, on the other hand, largely fail to
explain why people withhold responses to very specific
requests and what heuristics they use to differentiate real
and fraudulent messages. Largely unexplored temporal
effects, such as mood and emotion (see Gasper, 2004),
provide a platform for broader contextual understanding
of the fraud process.
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Appendix Systematic Review Technical Data
1. Review title:
i. Psychology, fraud, and risk
2. Review question
i. How have psychological mechanisms been applied to
help understand the individual determinants of consumer sus-
ceptibility to online fraud victimisation?
3. Search terms
i. Offence type: (fraud; scam; phishing; swindles; advance-
fee)
ii. Offence subtype: (consumer; online; internet; cyber; door;
telephone; email)
iii. Focus on victim not offender: (victim; victimisation; vic-
timization; victimhood; victimology; vulnerability; sus-
ceptibility; risk)
iv. Employing psychology: (persuasion; heuristics; decision-
making; elaboration; attention; bias; social-engineering;
judgement; influence; personality; mental-models; psy-
chology; cognition)
4. Search database input fields
i. TITLE(fraud OR scam OR phishing OR swindles
OR “advance fee”) AND ALL(consumer OR online
OR internet OR cyber OR door OR telephone OR
email) AND ALL(victim OR victimisation OR vic-
timization OR victimhood OR victimology OR vul-
nerabi l i ty OR suscept ibi l i ty OR risk) AND
ALL(persuasion OR heuristics OR “decision mak-
ing” OR elaboration OR attention OR bias OR “so-
cial engineering” OR judgement OR influence OR
personality OR mental-models OR psychology OR
cognition)
5. Possible databases
i. Social science databases: PsychINFO; Psych
Articles; Web of knowledge core collections; social
s c i ence p remium co l l ec t ion v ia P roQues t ;
EBSCOhost; Science Direct; Wiley Online library;
Scopus; PubMed; International bibliography of the
social sciences; Applied social science index and
abstract; Periodicals archive online via ProQuest
ii. Criminology databases: Criminology collection via
ProQuest; Sociological abstracts; Sage criminology;
Criminal justice abstracts
iii. Grey literature:British library collections; Google schol-
ar; British library direct; Dissertation abstracts online;
COS conference paper index; open grey www.
opengrey.eu/; EthOS; WorldCat
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6. Search results
7. Exclusion criteria applied to screening results
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons At t r ibut ion 4 .0 In te rna t ional License (h t tp : / /
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appro-
priate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the
Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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